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## Does Adlai Agree With Nixon on Foreign Policy?

One episode which counts heavily against Richard Nixon is that in the crisis over Indochina he sided with Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles for intervention. Nixon was ready for war rather than compromise with Ho Chi-minh's Communist forces. In the intra-Administration struggle, the war party led by Nixon, Radford and Dulles lost out to Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson and Army Chief of Staff Ridgway who persuaded Eisenhower to keep hands off and let the French make a settlement. The full story of what happened is not known, but if the peace party in the Administration had not been backed by an anti-interventionist reaction in Congress, Ike might have decided the other way and given us a second Korea the year after a truce had ended the fighting in the first. So close were we to a new war.

What would the Democrats have done if they had been in power? Do they think Eisenhower made the wrong decision? Does Adlai Stevenson agree with Nixon? Does Stevenson think we should have gone to war over Indochina? These are fundamental questions for all who think peace the No. 1 issue in this election. They are raised by the statement which was the opening gun in Stevenson's campaign—the analysis of the Republican platform which he released from his farm at Libertyville, Illinois. It purports to be a point-by-point refutation of the GOP platform. Point 2 of the document deals with the Republican claim, "The advance of communism has been checked." And this is what the document released by Stevenson has to say:

"This ignores the Communist take-over of Northern Vietnam, in which the Eisenhower Administration acquiesced after saying that Indochina was indispensable to the defense of Southeast Asia. It also ignores the Communist take-over of the Tachen islands in the Formosa straits after the Administration had forced Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate them."

### Is This "Leadership and Truth"?

How is this extraordinary passage to be read? "What this country needs," Stevenson said in his acceptance speech, "is leadership and truth?" Where is the leadership here and where is the truth? Are these words about Indochina and the Tachen islands to be taken seriously? Does Stevenson mean them? Or is this just the usual campaign demagoguery? If demagoguery, it is most irresponsible. Stevenson's acceptance speech pictured "a new America which everlastingly attacks the ancient idea that men can solve their differences by killing each other." Were those words meant to be taken seriously? How can Stevenson a few days later release as his own a document which implies that the eight years of futile bloodletting in Indochina should have been continued, if necessary by an infusion of American blood?

Where does Stevenson stand on the overriding issue of

peace? Does he agree with Eisenhower or with Nixon? Eisenhower said in his acceptance speech that with the new thermonuclear weapons "war has become not just tragic but preposterous." Nixon's was a different tune. He showed himself still of the same mind as when he sent up that trial balloon for American intervention in Indochina, with U.S. infantry if necessary. Nixon said—and his words deserve the closest attention against the background of the Stevenson release—"Great as the temptation may be at times to think only of our security at the moment, we shall never resort to this cynical type of compromise which may seem to promise peace for ourselves but which would inevitably bring war or surrender for our children."

### What Children Would Be Left?

Nixon thought the Indochinese settlement a "cynical compromise." Do Stevenson and the Democrats agree with him? Would they have given us a second Korea had they been in power? Is this how they would react to a similar crisis in the future? These are the gravest of questions. For Eisenhower, war has become not only tragic but "preposterous" as a means of settling human differences. But for Nixon, war is still feasible, necessary and sometimes wise. For him the H-bomb does not exist, else he could not talk of preferring the risk of war now to compromises which "would inevitably bring war or surrender for our children." What children and what war in the wasteland a third and thermonuclear war would make of this planet? This is the kind of thinking which makes us fearful of having Nixon succeed Eisenhower. But what kind of choice do we have if Stevenson launches his campaign with statements which agree with Nixon?

And not only with Nixon. Let us go to Point 3, in the document from Libertyville. This purports to rebut the Republican boast, "The Korean war was brought to a close." And here Stevenson and the Democrats are not ashamed to take their stand with Knowland. All the Democrats have to say in rebuttal is this, "Senate Republican leader Knowland has denounced the Korean armistice as a 'truce without honor' and is reported to have denounced suggestions by Eisenhower and Dulles that the campaign in Korea was a victory for collective security." The Democrats and Stevenson were content to deal with this crucial question of the campaign with this single sentence quoted from a *New York Times* story of July 28, 1953 which reported how bitterly the China Lobby and the China Firsters reacted to peace in Korea. Knowland and Chiang wanted the war to go on. Does Stevenson agree with them? Or was he just being irresponsible? Does he think this a serious issue and a serious campaign—or just a ball game in which it is good fun to yell anything at the pitcher on the opposing team?

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## Stevenson Most Shocking In His Sour Reaction to The Summit Meeting

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Against this background let us go back to Point 2, and re-read those extraordinary words about "forcing" Chiang to evacuate the Tachen islands and "ignoring" the Chinese Communist repossession of those islands. Do Stevenson and the Democrats believe we should have encouraged Chiang to stay in the Tachens? Do they agree with Knowland and Chiang that we should have risked war with China, a major war, over the insignificant, rocky, barren and strategically unimportant Tachens? The evacuation of the Tachens in January, 1953, was the second biggest avoidance of war "on the brink" by the Eisenhower Administration. Knowland was appeased by that joint Congressional resolution giving Eisenhower power to wage preventive war over China which only a handful of Democrats led by Morse and Lehman fought.

### The Need For Disengagement

The most important problem in the world today is slowly to disengage the United States from involvement in the Chinese civil war and the Chinese revolution, to get Washington to recognize realities in the Far East and to permit the Pacific to settle down in peace. Stevenson says he is anxious to rebuild American prestige abroad. The most important single step would be to show that it was again possible for America to talk sense on China and get out of the emotional shackles welded by a sinister decade of political propaganda and corruption by Chiang's henchmen, who seek to redress with American blood what they lost by their own incapacity. Stevenson knows the truth about this. He is capable of the leadership. Will he give us a little of the truth and leadership he promised? Or will he tie his own hands in the future by echoing and endorsing all this wicked China lobby nonsense?

### Algeria and Indochina: How Equate Them?

I want to turn for a moment to the colonial question. Point 9 of the Stevenson document accuses the Republicans of consistently siding with the colonial powers and blames them for backing France in Algeria. How can this be equated with what the Democrats have to say of Indochina? First of all they talk of Indochina as if it were not at all a French problem but only an American problem. France was bleeding its best youth in Indochina; the longer the struggle went on, the more Ho was pushed into dependence on Communist China, the less the chance of a settlement that might have preserved some friendly linkage between a united Vietnam and France. The French wanted peace in Indochina as we wanted peace in Korea; they felt we were forcing them to continue the war for our own purposes. They feel the upshot has been that we took Southern Vietnam from their empire and added it to ours. All Asia sees our Indochinese policy as colonialism, blames Dulles for blocking the peaceful elections promised at Geneva, sees a divided Indochina as another open wound in which the germs of a new Korea fester. This is the colonialism Stevenson and the Democrats pass over in silent approval while dismissing the far more complex problem of Algeria with an oversimplified slogan that must deeply offend French pride. The Arabs have rights in Algeria but so do the French and it would be the part of a wise American statesmanship to help reconcile them, rather than to exacerbate ill feeling. This again is unworthy of Stevenson.

We leave to the last the most disappointing and the most disturbing point of all in the Democratic "rebuttal" of the Republican platform insofar as it deals with foreign policy. This is Point 4, which deals with "President Eisenhower's Success at Geneva." Nothing in the statement released from Libertyville was more small-minded. Let us remember that it was Senator George, the Democratic party's foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, with an assist behind the scenes from Stevenson himself, which overcame the animosity of Dulles to a summit conference and brought Eisenhower to Geneva. Dulles had hoped by the premature release of the Yalta papers to smear both the Democrats and the idea of a new top level talk. The British and French had been angrily pressing for such a conference. It was necessary to break the stale ice of the cold war. It was urgent if mankind were to be saved from drift to a thermonuclear war.

### The Smiles Were Mutually Beneficial

How Senator George must blush at the pettiness with which Stevenson and the Democrats dismiss what was in large part George's achievement! All they have to offer on the complex problems involved is this, and we quote it in its entirety: "The Communists actually used the Geneva conference to their propaganda advantage. The *New York Times* reported, for example, (8/28/55) that they used 'smiling photographs of President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin to their own advantage' in Western Europe to give respectability to Communist parties in Western Europe and to lessen agitation in Eastern Europe." No more than this on the turning point of our time, the beginning of the slow tide back toward peace and co-existence.

Let us look at these two mangy sentences more closely. Of course, the Communists actually used the Geneva conference to their propaganda advantage. But so did we. Eisenhower dramatized for all the world to see that the President of the United States was not a warmonger, that he was prepared to meet in friendly spirit with the Communist leaders, that he was ready to embark upon that relaxation of tension which all the world's peoples desire. This image of a peaceful America rebutted a decade of Communist propaganda and neutralist fear. It was Eisenhower's greatest success and an American triumph. It made us new friends everywhere. And far from lessening agitation in East Europe, it encouraged the thaw which is loosening the iron grip of dictatorship and offering some hope at last of freedom in the Soviet bloc.

### Too Much "Bipartisanship"

Against this background we read with dismay the complaint in the Stevenson document that the Republicans failed to carry on a bipartisan foreign policy, especially the statement "Most notably, it [the Eisenhower Administration] has appointed no Democrat to the high policy post in the State Department which Dulles himself occupied under the Democrats." Dulles and the Democrats were much too congenial. The policies of Truman and Acheson were more in accord with the views of Dulles and Nixon than with those of Eisenhower and George. We thought Stevenson agreed with George. We looked to Stevenson for a continuation of the thaw. We cheered him in 1952 for his break with the stale cliches of Truman's cold war. We want him now to make clear that he does not stand with Richard Nixon.

## Worm's Eye View of the Coming Campaign from A Vacationing Capitol

The campaign begins with the Republicans afraid of sounding reactionary, the Democrats of sounding too liberal. . . . Eisenhower, a captive of the Republicans, would like nothing better than a brain truster like Stevenson; Stevenson would feel quite comfortable as Eisenhower's Secretary of State. . . . The inhibitions of both parties and the basic agreement of both candidates make for a phoney campaign. . . . It will be interesting to see what happens when it reaches the mud-slinging stage. . . .

### Can the Democrats Win?

Can the Democrats win? . . . I believe they can. . . . Three factors work in their favor: the patronage-hungry South will be regular this time; the farmers have been doing badly and like Kefauver; Nixon will cost the Republicans votes. . . . In addition, no one really knows what effect the President's two illnesses have had on public thinking; one mild upset before November might swing the election. . . . There is also that curious remark by the President that he was going to have another checkup before the election, and would then let the country know whether he could serve. . . . The Democrats may easily overdo the health issue; nobody really dislikes the President—except the McCarthy crowd; exuberant emphasis on a man's misfortunes goes against the grain of decent, ordinary feeling; there is danger of a boomerang against the Democrats. . . .

### The Glamor Is Gone

An important element in the campaign is that Stevenson is no longer the hero he was in 1952. . . . Everywhere one encounters a vague dissatisfaction and disillusion with the man; rarely does one come across the enthusiasm of four years ago. . . . In part this is due to the fact that as front-runner for the nomination, Stevenson was well advised to be cautious; he had everything to lose by saying too much. . . . But one of the problems now is to reawaken the old enthusiasm. . . . Stevenson sounds as if he has heard so much criticism of his wit and brains that he is afraid to use them. . . . He lacks something usually essential in politics: a certain virile, regular guy quality. . . . But a man can only make up for what he lacks by being more fully and truly himself. . . . Nothing was more flattering than to have Stevenson talk to the voters on the assumption that they were as bright as he. . . . I am in favor of a so-called high level campaign because that is natural to Stevenson and his only hope is to be himself. . . .

### Which Is Better on Israel?

On the Israel issue in the campaign: the Democrats are more friendly to Israel than the Republicans, though that did not keep the State Department bureaucracy from being its own natural hostile self under Truman. . . . The Democratic platform promises the arms Israel needs very badly. . . . Dulles is basically anti-Israel and anti-Jewish; he took quite cozily to the Nazis and was isolationist and against aid to Britain and France when it looked as if Hitler might overrun Europe. . . . Eisenhower is a man of quite a different point of view, but he accepts the Pentagon attitude that basically Israel is a nuisance which endangers bases in the Arab States. . . . Unfortunately Stevenson has been subjected to too much high pressure from Zionist friends, and tends to react the other way. . . . Over-selling is a danger here. . . .

### Tribute to Lehman

We join in saluting Herbert Lehman on his retirement from public life. . . . We know of no man in our time who has made a more honorable and progressive record as Governor and Senator. . . . He will be missed in the Senate, which has too few men of his stature. . . . We do not see Mayor Wagner as a substitute nor as the man his father was. . . . Any Mayor who would pick Peter Campbell Brown as his chief law officer gives no promise of anything but adding to those voices in the Senate which undermine the Bill of Rights. . . . While Brown appeals the recent Allen decision that teachers need not inform, Wagner cannot pose as a liberal. . . . We would vote for Javits on the Republican ticket against any Democratic nominee now in sight, just as we would vote for John Sherman Cooper if we lived in Kentucky, and for same reasons: both men in Congress showed great courage and understanding on fundamental civil liberties issues. . . . Why don't the Democrats nominate Celler? We know of no other Democrat whose years of service in Congress and whose integrity and liberalism better qualify him to step into Lehman's shoes. . . .

### The Riesel Case

We don't believe in trial by newspaper and dislike the kind of publicity ballyhoo in which the FBI and District Attorneys customarily indulge. . . . Whether Johnny Dio and Charles Tusso arranged the acid attack which blinded Victor Riesel is for a jury to determine. . . . But the case will not be solved until the higher-ups who paid for this attack have been convicted. . . . What is already convicted, however, is the labor movement which has too long allowed itself to be infested with known racketeers, gangsters and strong-arm men. . . . Union locals are too often bought and sold for the money which can be milked from them, especially welfare fund and insurance profits. . . . It is shocking that a newspaperman who has crusaded against these crooks can be blinded in the middle of a great city like New York and arouse so little public indignation. . . . Most shocking of all is the kind of silly, vicious talk to be heard from those who dislike Riesel's views. . . . This acid attack was an attack on a free press, and a fundamental challenge to society. . . . To let the gangsters get away with it is to encourage them to expand their dictatorship from the cowed locals they control to wider circles. . . . The Riesel case ought not to end until public outcry has forced the AFL-CIO to clean house; there are already places in the top hierarchy of American trade unionism where it is hard to tell whether a man is a genuine union leader or just a racketeer who graduated. . . .

### A Glance Abroad

London and Paris will regard as most unfriendly the State Department's allowing Egypt to recruit Suez Canal pilots in this country. . . . West Germany, which would like to replace the British and France in Egypt, is also allowing Kiel canal pilots to be recruited there. . . . In this, as on so many similar issues, a discreet Washington-Bonn axis is visible. . . . Note that censorship in Moscow suddenly broke off transmission of an Associated Press dispatch dated August 23 which quoted Krushchev as saying at a Rumanian celebration that if war breaks out over Suez, "the Arabs will not stand alone. It will be a just war and there will be volunteers." . . . The man is really irresponsible. . . .

## What Our Easy Detection of the New Soviet Nuclear Test Really Means

### This May Be Humanity's Last Chance and It Is Slipping By Unnoticed

Criminal is not too strong a word for the failure of our press and political leadership to bring home to the American people the real significance of our announcement that the Soviets had made a new nuclear test. This is what it means:

1. The Russians cannot make such a test without our knowing about it. 2. This in turn means that if an international agreement is reached to ban further thermonuclear tests, it is enforceable without any elaborate system of inspection. A self-enforcing agreement is still possible in this limited but crucial area.

3. It is in this area that the new terror, the intercontinental ballistic missile is being developed. The IBM will have a thermonuclear warhead. We could still prevent its development by world agreement banning further tests. According to Ralph Lapp, the relatively small size of the Soviet blast means that they were testing such a missile, though not yet of intercontinental range.

Once the IBM is developed, the world picture may be revolutionized strategically in so fundamental a sense as to transform the thinking of mankind. Foreign bases and allies will no longer be essential. The possibility of sudden attack will be so terrifying that a Fortress America and a Fortress Russia may glower at each other in mutual panic across a world in-between which could be rendered a wasteland overnight.

#### Not Just A Technological Problem

As we get closer to the IBM, fear and tension will increase. This increase will make more difficult the only solution which will begin to seem adequate: a system of mutual inspection, on the ground and from the air, so much more extensive than anything yet envisaged as to become a form of world government. Yet there is no prospect whatsoever of achieving such a solution, given the cave-man era hates and suspicions which still govern the heart of man, whether he lives under capitalism or communism, democracy or dictatorship.

An added complexity may soon make itself felt. Both the Americans and the Russians are expansionist in the same way, like giants spreading their limbs over a continent, but neither are aggressive militaristic powers. What happens when such

weapons—including the missile—are in the hands of peoples like the Germans and the Japanese with a strong military caste and tradition?

In the shadow of these vast changes, a Russo-American agreement as the cornerstone of a world agreement against further tests could save humanity. The immediate obstacle has been British unwillingness to foster such an agreement until Britain, too, has the H-bomb and can sit in on the thermonuclear Great Power poker game. With the British tests of next spring, British opinion will become an ally in the drive against further testing.

#### Only Stevenson Has Spoken Up

In this country the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission (except perhaps for Commissioner Murray) are against any ban on tests. One of the reasons for the hatred and suspicion of Robert Oppenheimer is that he was one of those scientists who urged that the U.S., instead of embarking on a crash program for the H-bomb under Truman, try first for a self-enforcing no-test agreement with the Russians which could have shut the door on development of the H-bomb altogether.

The one American political figure who has had the courage to speak out at all is Adlai Stevenson in his address last April 21 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington. He suggested that the U. S. call off its hydrogen bomb tests this year. The Soviet Union formally proposed a ban on all hydrogen weapon tests at London last March 31; Nehru urged it several years ago.

In discussing the new Soviet test, the *New York Times* tried to explain why we, unlike the Russians, could not test on our own territory: "We have more important cities to consider . . . there are vast stretches in the Soviet Union where nuclear weapons could be detonated safely." But the *Times* did not go on to point out the corollary: we are more vulnerable than the Soviet Union. We have an even greater interest than Moscow in putting a stop to this race toward the IBM. Are there no Americans left of sufficient stature—with courage to match—who can open up this subject effectively for public discussion?

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